About John Stuart Mill, a Male Feminist and Philosopher

19th Century Social and Political Philosopher

Mrs Bull and John Stuart Mill suffrage cartoon
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John Stuart Mill (1806 to 1873) is best known for his writings on liberty, ethics, human rights and economics. The utilitarian ethicist Jeremy Bentham was an influence in his youth. Mill, an atheist, was godfather to Bertrand Russell. A friend was Richard Pankhurst, the husband of suffrage activist Emmeline Pankhurst.

John Stuart Mill and Harriet Taylor had 21 years of an unmarried, intimate friendship. After her husband died, they married in 1851. That same year, she published an essay, "The Enfranchisement of Women," advocating for women being able to vote. It was barely three years after American women had called for women's suffrage at the Woman's Rights Convention at Seneca Falls, New York. The Mills claimed that a transcript of a speech by Lucy Stone from the 1850 Women's Rights Convention was their inspiration.

Harriet Taylor Mill died in 1858. Harriet's daughter served as his assistant in subsequent years. John Stuart Mill published On Liberty shortly before Harriet died, and many believe that Harriet had more than a small influence on that work.

"The Subjection of Women"

Mill wrote "The Subjection of Women" in 1861, though it was not published until 1869. In this, he argues for education of women and for "perfect equality" for them. He credited Harriet Taylor Mill with co-authoring the essay, but few at the time or later took it seriously. Even today, many feminists accept his word on this, while many non-feminist historians and authors do not. The opening paragraph of this essay makes his position quite clear:

The object of this Essay is to explain as clearly as I am able grounds of an opinion which I have held from the very earliest period when I had formed any opinions at all on social political matters, and which, instead of being weakened or modified, has been constantly growing stronger by the progress reflection and the experience of life. That the principle which regulates the existing social relations between the two sexes - the legal subordination of one sex to the other - is wrong itself, and now one of the chief hindrances to human improvement; and that it ought to be replaced by a principle of perfect equality, admitting no power or privilege on the one side, nor disability on the other.


From 1865 to 1868, Mill served as a Member of Parliament. In 1866, he became the first M.P. ever to call for women being given the vote, introducing a bill written by his friend Richard Pankhurst. Mill continued to advocate for women's vote along with other reforms including additional suffrage extensions. He served as president of the Society for Women's Suffrage, founded in 1867.

Extending Suffrage to Women

In 1861, Mill had published Considerations on Representative Government, advocating for for a universal but graduated suffrage. This was the basis for many of his efforts in Parliament. Here is an excerpt from chapter VIII, "Of the Extension of the Suffrage," where he discusses women's voting rights:

In the preceding argument for universal but graduated suffrage, I have taken no account of difference of sex. I consider it to be as entirely irrelevant to political rights as difference in height or in the color of the hair. All human beings have the same interest in good government; the welfare of all is alike affected by it, and they have equal need of a voice in it to secure their share of its benefits. If there be any difference, women require it more than men, since, being physically weaker, they are more dependent on law and society for protection. Mankind have long since abandoned the only premises which will support the conclusion that women ought not to have votes. No one now holds that women should be in personal servitude; that they should have no thought, wish, or occupation but to be the domestic drudges of husbands, fathers, or brothers. It is allowed to unmarried, and wants but little of being conceded to married women to hold property, and have pecuniary and business interests in the same manner as men. It is considered suitable and proper that women should think, and write, and be teachers. As soon as these things are admitted, the political disqualification has no principle to rest on. The whole mode of thought of the modern world is, with increasing emphasis, pronouncing against the claim of society to decide for individuals what they are and are not fit for, and what they shall and shall not be allowed to attempt. If the principles of modern politics and political economy are good for any thing, it is for proving that these points can only be rightly judged of by the individuals themselves; and that, under complete freedom of choice, wherever there are real diversities of aptitude, the greater number will apply themselves to the things for which they are on the average fittest, and the exceptional course will only be taken by the exceptions. Either the whole tendency of modern social improvements has been wrong, or it ought to be carried out to the total abolition of all exclusions and disabilities which close any honest employment to a human being.
But it is not even necessary to maintain so much in order to prove that women should have the suffrage. Were it as right as it is wrong that they should be a subordinate class, confined to domestic occupations and subject to domestic authority, they would not the less require the protection of the suffrage to secure them from the abuse of that authority. Men, as well as women, do not need political rights in order that they may govern, but in order that they may not be misgoverned. The majority of the male sex are, and will be all their lives, nothing else than laborers in corn-fields or manufactories; but this does not render the suffrage less desirable for them, nor their claim to it less irresistible, when not likely to make a bad use of it. Nobody pretends to think that woman would make a bad use of the suffrage. The worst that is said is that they would vote as mere dependents, the bidding of their male relations. If it be so, so let it be. If they think for themselves, great good will be done; and if they do not, no harm. It is a benefit to human beings to take off their fetters, even if they do not desire to walk. It would already be a great improvement in the moral position of women to be no longer declared by law incapable of an opinion, and not entitled to a preference, respecting the most important concerns of humanity. There would be some benefit to them individually in having something to bestow which their male relatives can not exact, and are yet desirous to have. It would also be no small matter that the husband would necessarily discuss the matter with his wife, and that the vote would not be his exclusive affair, but a joint concern. People do not sufficiently consider how markedly the fact that she is able to have some action on the outward world independently of him, raises her dignity and value in a vulgar man's eyes, and makes her the object of a respect which no personal qualities would ever obtain for one whose social existence he can entirely appropriate. The vote itself, too, would be improved in quality. The man would often be obliged to find honest reasons for his vote, such as might induce a more upright and impartial character to serve with him under the same banner. The wife's influence would often keep him true to his own sincere opinion. Often, indeed, it would be used, not on the side of public principle, but of the personal interest or worldly vanity of the family. But, wherever this would be the tendency of the wife's influence, it is exerted to the full already in that bad direction, and with the more certainty, since under the present law and custom she is generally too utter a stranger to politics in any sense in which they involve principle to be able to realize to herself that there is a point of honor in them; and most people have as little sympathy in the point of honor of others, when their own is not placed in the same thing, as they have in the religious feelings of those whose religion differs from theirs. Give the woman a vote, and she comes under the operation of the political point of honor. She learns to look on politics as a thing on which she is allowed to have an opinion, and in which, if one has an opinion, it ought to be acted upon; she acquires a sense of personal accountability in the matter, and will no longer feel, as she does at present, that whatever amount of bad influence she may exercise, if the man can but be persuaded, all is right, and his responsibility covers all. It is only by being herself encouraged to form an opinion, and obtain an intelligent comprehension of the reasons which ought to prevail with the conscience against the temptations of personal or family interest, that she can ever cease to act as a disturbing force on the political conscience of the man. Her indirect agency can only be prevented from being politically mischievous by being exchanged for direct.
I have supposed the right of suffrage to depend, as in a good state of things it would, on personal conditions. Where it depends, as in this and most other countries, on conditions of property, the contradiction is even more flagrant. There something more than ordinarily irrational in the fact that when a woman can give all the guarantees required from a male elector, independent circumstances, the position of a householder and head of a family, payment of taxes, or whatever may be the conditions imposed, the very principle and system of a representation based on property is set aside, and an exceptionally personal disqualification is created for the mere purpose of excluding her. When it is added that in the country where this is done a woman now reigns, and that the most glorious ruler whom that country ever had was a woman, the picture of unreason and scarcely disguised injustice is complete. Let us hope that as the work proceeds of pulling down, one after another, the remains of the mouldering fabric of monopoly and tyranny, this one will not be the last to disappear; that the opinion of Bentham, of Mr. Samuel Bailey, of Mr. Hare, and many other of the most powerful political thinkers of this age and country (not to speak of others), will make its way to all minds not rendered obdurate by selfishness or inveterate prejudice; and that, before the lapse another generation, the accident of sex, no more than the accident of skin, will be deemed a sufficient justification for depriving its possessor of the equal protection and just privileges of a citizen. (Chapter VIII "Of the Extension of the Suffrage" from Considerations of Representative Government, by John Stuart Mill, 1861.)
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Lewis, Jone Johnson. "About John Stuart Mill, a Male Feminist and Philosopher." ThoughtCo, Apr. 5, 2023, thoughtco.com/john-stuart-mill-male-feminist-3530510. Lewis, Jone Johnson. (2023, April 5). About John Stuart Mill, a Male Feminist and Philosopher. Retrieved from https://www.thoughtco.com/john-stuart-mill-male-feminist-3530510 Lewis, Jone Johnson. "About John Stuart Mill, a Male Feminist and Philosopher." ThoughtCo. https://www.thoughtco.com/john-stuart-mill-male-feminist-3530510 (accessed June 6, 2023).